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Abstract— This paper explores the resistance of MOS Cur-
rent Mode Logic (MCML) against Differential Power Analysis
(DPA) attacks. Circuits implemented in MCML, in fact, have
unique characteristics both in terms of power consumption
and the dependency of the power profile from the input signal
pattern. Therefore, MCML is suitable to protect cryptographic
hardware from DPA and similar side-channel attacks.
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of different logic
styles against power analysis attacks, the non-linear bijective
function of the Kasumi algorithm (known as substitution box
S7) was implemented with CMOS and MCML technology, and
a set of attacks was performed using power traces derived from
SPICE-level simulations. Although all keys were discovered for
CMOS, only very few attacks to MCML were successful.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past ten years, a number of new techniques
for attacking implementations of cryptographic algorithms
have been discovered. These techniques exploit information
leaking from a device (e.g., a smart card) while data is
being processed. The term side-channel attacks summarizes
all possible ways of collecting the leaked information: power
consumption, timing, and electromagnetic emission are pos-
sible examples [11]. Side-channel attacks which exploit the
power consumed by a device were reported for the first time
in 1999 by Kocher et al [10]. The power consumption of a
device strongly depends on the data being processed, thus
leaks information about the secret key. Among the different
variants of power-based attacks, differential power analysis
(DPA) and correlation power analysis (CPA) are of particular
interest since they do not require specific knowledge about
the implementation of the target device to be effective.
In this paper we analyse and demonstrate the robustness
of a special logic style, namely MOS Current Mode Logic
(MCML), against DPA and CPA attacks. Previous papers on
this subject just argued robustness qualitatively or required
hardware manufacturing to prove it. Contrary to past work
we evaluated the robustness of MCML with real attacks and
without the need for manufacturing prototypes. In fact, we
developed a SPICE-level simulation environment that allows
to collect power traces in reasonable time, paving the way
to a more direct experimental study of DPA-resistance. Our
results show that the traces obtained by simulating an S-box
realised in MCML technology are difficult to attack. On the
other hand, the same attacks were always successful when
performed on a CMOS implementation of the S-box.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II discusses related work, Section III overviews the
Kasumi algorithm, and Section IV describes the MCML
technology. The design flow proposed in this paper, including
simulation-based power analysis, is explained in detail in
Section V, and simulation results are presented in Section
VI. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Side-channel cryptanalysis has emerged as a serious threat
for smart cards and other types of embedded systems per-
forming cryptographic operations. Some side-channel attacks
are an extremely powerful and practical tool for breaking
commercial implementations of cryptography. These attacks
exploit the fact that any execution of a cryptographic algo-
rithm on a physical device leaks information about sensitive
data (e.g., secret keys) involved in the computations. Many
sources of side-channel information have been discovered in
recent years, including the power consumption and timing
characteristics of a device [9], [10], as well as deliberately
introduced computational faults [3].
Simple power analysis (SPA) uses the leaked information
from a single computation, while differential power analysis
(DPA) utilizes statistical methods to evaluate the information
observed from multiple computations [10]. Currently, there
exists no perfect protection against DPA attacks. However, by
applying appropriate countermeasures, it is possible to make
the attacker’s task more difficult. Proposed countermeasures
range from algorithmic techniques [6], [16] over architectural
approaches [13], [14], [8] down to hardware-related methods
[15], [17]. All algorithmic and architectural countermeasures
have in common that they introduce either amplitude noise
(to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio) or timing noise (to
obscure the alignment of power traces). In both cases, more
power traces must be captured to mount an attack.
A multitude of so-called DPA-resistant logic styles have
been proposed during the past five years. The idea behind
these logic styles is to tackle to problem of side-channel
leakage at its actual root, namely at the hardware level. The
power consumption of circuits realized with DPA-resistant
logic cells is uniform and, in the ideal case, independent
of the processed data and the performed operations. The first
concrete implementation of a DPA-resistant logic style was
reported by Tiri et al in 2002 [17]. Their Sense Amplifier
Based Logic (SABL) combines the concepts of dual-rail
logic and pre-charge logic [11]. SABL cells have a constant
power consumption, provided that they are designed and
implemented in a carefully balanced way. All SABL cells
of a circuit are connected to the clock signal and become
pre-charged simultaneously, which causes very high current
peaks. Furthermore, SABL cells require at least twice as
much silicon area as conventional CMOS cells and suffer
also from high delay. Besides the logic cells also the wires
connecting these cells must be routed in a special balanced
way to achieve a uniform power profile.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE KASUMI ALGORITHM
We focus on the block cipher Kasumi [1], which represents
the base of the standardized confidentiality algorithm of the
3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project). Kasumi is a
Feistel cipher with eight rounds and produces a 64-bit output
from a 64-bit input, whereby the secret key has a length
of 128 bits. During encryption, the input I is divided into
two 32-bit strings, called L0 and R0. Then, for the following
i rounds, Li and Ri are defined as
Ri = Li−1 (1)
Li = Ri−1⊕ fi(Li−1,RKi) (2)
where fi denotes the round function within Li and the round
key RKi. The round function fi is constructed from sub-
functions and has two different forms depending on whether
it is an even or odd round. It uses two S-boxes: S7, which
maps a 7-bit input to a 7-bit output, and S9, which maps a
9-bit input to a 9-bit output. These two S-boxes have been
designed in such a way that they can be easily implemented
using a look-up table as well as combinatorial logic.
Fig. 1. Overview of the considered part of the Kasumi Algorithm.
In this paper we focus on the S7 S-box. We implemented
it as combinatorial logic composed of two level of AND-OR
gates, as suggested in the standard specifications. Figure 1
shows a block diagram of the example that we consider in
this paper. The secret key is added to the plaintext and the
result is used to feed the substitution function. After the
non-linear transformation is calculated, the result is stored
in a bank of D flip-flops. Such a setup coarsely reflects a
one-round-per-clock-cycle implementation, and is the basic
configuration for a DPA attack. A real implementation may
differ from the one considered here; however our goal is
to estimate the level of robustness intrinsically given by the
logic style, instead of attacking a particular implementation
of the Kasumi block cipher.
IV. DESIGN OF DPA-RESISTANT FUNCTIONAL UNITS
USING MCML GATES
The circuit-level implementation of DPA-resistant logic
gates requires systematic use of circuit techniques that: (i)
have significantly suppressed power supply current levels,
(ii) do not produce prominent current spikes or fluctuations
during the switching events, and (iii) do not exhibit a
significant input pattern-dependence with respect to current
drawn from the power supply [18]. It is worth noting that
the classical CMOS logic gates do not fare particularly well
in any of these categories, and therefore, are not considered
to be a good choice for DPA-resistance, in general. Standard
CMOS digital gates are notorious for generating sharp and
input-pattern dependent current pulses (also referred to as
delta-I noise [7], [2]) due to charging and discharging of the
gate’s parasitic capacitances and fan-out. This delta-I noise
is directly measurable as disturbances on the power supplies
and the substrate, which can be an important drawback when
designing a DPA-resistant system.
Several different circuit design styles have been explored
as possible candidates for better DPA-resistance, including
differential circuit techniques like SABL [17] and Current
Mode Logic (CML). CML reduces the generated switching
noise by about two orders of magnitude [19], [12], hence
making it suitable for DPA-resistant hardware designs. This
reduction is due to the differential and current steering nature
of the logic style. The low delta-I noise generation combined
with approximately the same amount of power dissipation
as its CMOS counterpart makes the CML style an excellent
candidate for DPA-resistant logic gate design.
Fig. 2. Schematic of an MCML buffer (or MCML inverter, depending on
the output signal definition).
A MOS Current Mode Logic (MCML) gate consists of a
tail current source, a current steering logic core, and a
differential load, as shown for the simplest MCML gate, the
MCML buffer, in Figure 2. The operation of MCML circuits
is based on the principle of re-directing (or switching) the
current of a constant current source through a fully differen-
tial network of input transistors, and utilizing the reduced-
swing voltage drop on a pair of complementary load devices
as the output. Note that a logic inversion without additional
delay is possible by simply exchanging the differential ter-
minals. It is desired that the input voltage fully switches the
tail current (Ibias) one way or the other. If the input pair is
not completely switched, part of the tail current is common
for both input transistors and does not contribute in the
differential output signal. Furthermore, if the input pair is not
fully switched, the actual differential output current will be
sensitive to temperature and input pair offset voltage, which
is an undesirable property. The operation principle already
suggests that the power consumption is static (the circuit
must dissipate the same amount of current continuously)
regardless of the switching activity and fan-out conditions.
True differential operation of the circuit with small output
voltage swing ensures fast switching times. Note that the
propagation delay is proportional to the output swing, and
independent of the power supply voltage. Other advantages
include better noise immunity compared to classical CMOS
logic circuits, and significantly less switching noise.
The power dissipation of a CMOS gate is simply the
product of operation frequency and the charging/discharging
power per unit switching. Thus, the average current a CMOS
gate draws from the supply line increases linearly with the
operation frequency, while on the other hand, the operation
frequency has little impact on the power dissipation of an
MCML gate. The supply current fluctuation in MCML gates
is typically 5% of the nominal tail current during switching
events. Figure 3 shows the simulated current variation of an
MCML buffer for a fan-out of 5. MCML circuits are also
more robust against common-mode fluctuations (power sup-
ply noise) due to their inherent common-mode rejection as
a result of full differential signaling property.
From the DPA-resistance point-of-view, it can be seen that
the supply-current variation of the MCML gate will remain
significantly smaller during switching events, compared to
that of a conventional CMOS gate. At the same time, the
magnitude of the supply-current variation is largely inde-
pendent of the applied input vector, as well as of the fan-out
load capacitance. The amount of static current dissipation
can be reduced dramatically while preserving all of the
advantages concerning the DPA-resistance, at a lower speed,
when the transistor sizing is done to satisfy modest speed
constraints (e.g., a typical switching speed of 400MHz). It is
demonstrated in [19] that the designed MCML family using
a standard 0.18µm process technology with 400mVpp output
voltage swing at 400MHz operation frequency, dissipates
comparable power with respect to its CMOS counterpart
operating at the same speed. In this work the bias current and
active load size of MCML gates were adjusted to reach these
Fig. 3. Simulated gate delay and supply current fluctuation of an MCML
buffer for a fan-out of 5.
design specifications. The lower bound on voltage swing
was set to be 300mVpp to ensure complete current switching
even at the worst case design corner. The ratio between the
power dissipation of the MCML XOR gate and the classical
CMOS XOR gate was found to be less than a factor of two
at this nominal frequency, which compares quite favorably
with other DPA-resistant circuit styles.
The utility of the current-limited MCML gates in a DPA-
resistant design was demonstrated in [19], using the 7-input
Kasumi S-box function consisting of 105 two-input AND
and 77 two-input XOR gates. It was also shown [19] that the
peak current fluctuation of the classical CMOS realization is
in the order of 28mA, while the current fluctuation of the
MCML version remains confined to a narrow band of about
0.5mA, around the constant value of 11.5mA. A close-up
view of the supply-current variation of the Kasumi S7 S-box
function block clearly indicates the significant input-pattern
dependence of the classical CMOS version. In contrast, the
power supply current of the MCML version does not exhibit
any noticeable variation that depends on the applied input
patterns. The standard variation of the CMOS supply current
is demonstrated to be in the order of 10mA (28mA peak),
while the standard variation of the MCML supply current
remains less than 0.2mA (1mA peak) [19]. Possible effects
of measurement set-up on the readability of supply current
variations in both circuits were also monitored in [19]. The
probing instrument load was modelled, having a low-pass
filter characteristic and the filtered output was monitored. As
expected, the design based on CMOS logic still shows large
variations (400µA peak), sufficient to be distinguished quite
easily. On the other hand, the maximum current fluctuation
in the MCML-based design remains below 25µA, further
increasing DPA-resistance of the security-critical block.
V. DESIGN FLOW
The robustness of a hardware implementation of a block
cipher against power analysis attacks can be evaluated at
different stages of the design flow. The decisive proof is
obtained when the actual fabricated microchip is attacked
using high frequency probes and an oscilloscope; nonethe-
less, attacking the power consumption traces obtained with
transistor-level simulation can be useful to get a good ap-
proximation of the actual level of DPA-resistance, and an
indication of possible sources of weakness.
The transistor-level simulation has been carried out at very
high timing resolution (about 1ps) and with no additional
noise coming from the measurement device, other parts of the
circuit, or the environment. From one point of view, it is
therefore a “best-case” attack; however there are certainly
other effects that can not be correctly modelled, such as the
effects of the fabrication process. An important advantage is
that in this way it is also possible to iterate the design flow
to investigate further points of optimisation.
In the following we describe the design and simulation
flow that we have used to obtain power traces for both
the CMOS and the MCML implementation of the Kasumi
substitution box S7. Both implementations have the same
block structure (which is described in Section III), but their
code-entry and design process differs. The CMOS circuit
has been described using the VHDL language, synthesized
with Synopsys Design Compiler, and converted into SPICE
format. The technology library used for the CMOS circuit
models the UMC 0.18µm process installed and licensed in
the EPFL Electrical Engineering Department. On the other
hand, the MCML circuit has been described by hand using
the Spectre language, reflecting a two-level AND-XOR logic
implementation as suggested in the Kasumi specification
document. Therefore, it is expected that both the latency and
area of the second circuit are worse. However, the different
design approach is necessary since commercial synthesis
tools do not support non-standard differential logic libraries
like our MCML library.
The interconnection parasitics have not been taken into
account in the simulations, since a back-end phase followed
by back-annotation would be necessary to do this. Such a
back-end phase is meaningful only in the context of a com-
plete description of the circuit considering also clock-tree
expansion, floorplanning, and place & route steps. Thus, our
results will be indicative of the intrinsic robustness of the
logic primitives, more than the robustness of a particular
implementation of the system that includes the Kasumi block
cipher. Again, this is coherent with the goal of this paper.
Transistor level simulations have been performed with
Synopsys Nanosim, at highest level of accuracy. The SPICE
descriptions of the UMC18 and the MCML logic libraries
instantiate the BSIM3 p-MOS and n-MOS transistor models
[5]. Simulation results of Nanosim are comparable to those
of SPICE, but the simulation process requires significantly
less time to be carried out. The global current absorption
of the two S-box circuits has been monitored and dumped at
intervals of 1 ps. A post-processing step was performed on
the dumped values to obtain the continuous current vectors
readable by the application that performs the statistical
analysis, as described in the following Section.
VI. RESISTANCE AGAINST POWER ANALYSIS
In this section we describe the attacks we mounted on the
CMOS and MCML implementations of the Kasumi S-box
and we compare the results.
A typical DPA attack consists of the following steps: at
first, an intermediate key dependent result is selected as
the target, then the attacker encrypts (decrypts) a certain
number of known plaintexts (ciphertexts) and measures the
corresponding power consumption traces. Subsequently, hy-
pothetical intermediate values are calculated based on a key
guess and they are used as input of a selection function. This
function is used to partition the power consumption traces
into two sets, depending on the values of the intermediate
results. The difference of means of the two sets is then
calculated and shows a peak for the right key hypothesis
in correspondence to the time frame where the information
is leaked. For all other key guesses and points in time, the
difference of means is close to zero.
An improvement with respect to DPA attack, called corre-
lation power analysis (CPA), was discussed in [4]. It hypoth-
esizes the Hamming weight of the targeted S-box output and
evaluate the hypothesis statistically. The correlation ρ(P(t),H)
between the power traces Pn(t) and the hypothesis H is
calculated using the following equation:
ρ(P(t),H) =
cov(P(t),H)√
σ2P(t) ·σ2H
(3)
where σ2P(t) and σ
2
H are the variance of the power traces
Pn(t) and the hypothesis H, while cov(P(t),H) denotes
the covariance of the two. The correlation ρ(P(t),H) is a
normalized value between −1≤ ρ ≤ 1 where ρ = 1 (ρ =−1)
means that the variables P(t) and H are perfectly correlated
(anti-correlated) and ρ = 0 means there is no correlation at
all. The adversary calculates the correlation for each key
hypothesis and chooses the key which shows the strongest
correlation. Usually CPA shows better results than DPA
because it uses hypotheses based on multiple bits rather than
the single bit approach of DPA.
Mounting the Attacks
Using the simulation flow described in Section V, we
attacked the S7 S-box of Kasumi. It is important to notice
the differences between the simulated and the real attack. In
a real environment, an attacker has to collect a huge number
of traces in order to filter out the noise. In fact, when power
consumption of any device is measured, the collected traces
include noise. Increasing the number of traces, the noise can
be filtered out, as can be seen from Equation 4:
P(t) =
∑
g
f (g, t)+N (t) (4)
where P(t) is the total power consumptions of the device,
f (g, t) is the power consumption of a gate g at time t, and
N (t) is an uncorrelated normally distributed random variable
that represents the noise components.
DPA (bit used in the selection function) CPALogic Style 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 H.W.
CMOS 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128
MCML 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 4
TABLE I
SECRET KEYS FOUND BY DPA AND CPA ATTACKS.
The simulation environment we used is noise free: neither
white (thermal) noise nor algorithmic noise produced by
other components appear in the power trace. Hence, to fully
characterize the considered S-box, we need only 27 = 128
measurements, one for each of the 128 different plain text
inputs. Furthermore, the simulation was performed with a
very high resolution both for the current (1µA) and the time
(10ps), which is the best possible condition for an attacker.
DPA and CPA were performed on the two implementations
of the Kasumi S-box shown in Figure 4, the first realized
using CMOS technology and the second with MCML. The
attack was focused on the input of the register, as depicted in
Figure 4, since for CML, it is the part that we implemented
using a completely differential logic. Hence this is the point
of the circuit that was supposed to be fully protected.
Kasumi S7 Register
PlainText
SecretKey
Point of Attack
Fig. 4. Point of attack for DPA and CPA.
Table I reports the number of secret keys found while
attacking the two different S-box implementations. We have
repeated the DPA attack using all possible S-box output bits
as selection function. The CPA attack has been performed
with a selection function based on the Hamming weight. In
all these cases our attacks on the CMOS logic were always
successful. The differential trace of the correct key (plotted
in black) is the one that shows the highest peak, thus it is
clearly distinguishable from the remaining ones, as can be
seen from Figure 5 (DPA using selection function on bit 1)
and Figure 6 (CPA on the Hamming weight). In the latter
case, a correlation value as high as ρ(P(t),H) = 1 indicates the
correct hypothesis.
The situation is completely different for the implementa-
tion based on MCML. As can be seen from Figure 7, the
black line representing the correct key is not distinguishable
from the remaining differential traces plotted in gray. The
same situation is also valid for the correlation power attack
depicted in Figure 8.
As reported in Table I, a total number of nine keys was
found. Although this result can not be considered insignifi-
cant from a statistical point of view, it must be underlined
that the successful attacks mounted to MCML do not show
the usual situation for differential power analysis (DPA)
and correlation power analysis (CPA). As can be seen from
Figure 9, which shows an example of a successful DPA
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Fig. 5. DPA on CMOS technology.
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Fig. 6. CPA on CMOS technology.
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Fig. 7. DPA on MCML technology.
attack on bit 4 of the S-box output, the differential trace
corresponding to the correct key has the same shape as all
the others rather than clearly indicating a peak, thus the key
guess results to be correct only because the corresponding
trace is the external one. As a consequence, in an attack
mounted on a real device, it could be completely hidden by
so-called ghost peaks (peaks of similar height corresponding
to a wrong key guess), making the attack more difficult.
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Fig. 8. CPA on MCML technology.
We want to stress that the attacks were mounted within
a simulation environment, thus in ideal and best condition
for an attacker, both in terms of sampling rate accuracy and
absence of noise. We are currently evaluating if this eventual
dependence can be effectively exploited on a real device.
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Fig. 9. Successful DPA attack on MCML technology.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduced a simulation-based methodol-
ogy for evaluating the resistance of cryptographic circuits
to power analysis attacks. We validated our methodology
on the MCML technology, and demonstrated the robustness
of MCML against DPA and CPA attacks. Contrary to pre-
vious papers on this subject, we did not argue robustness
just qualitatively, but with real attacks. Furthermore, since
our approach is based on SPICE-level simulations, it does
not rely on the manufacturing of prototypes, which allows
a more direct experimental study of DPA-resistance.
Our results show that the power traces obtained by simulat-
ing the non-linear bijective function of the Kasumi algorithm
realised in MCML are very difficult to attack, as opposed to
a CMOS implementation for which the same attacks were
always successful. We are currently evaluating the robustness
of MCML against template attacks.
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